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Many low-income countries contend with a governance 
syndrome characterized by a difficult combination 
of seeming openness, weak institutions, and strong 
inter-elite contestation for power and resources. In 
such countries, neither broad-based policy nor public 
management reforms are likely to be feasible. But are 
broad-based approaches necessary? Theory and evidence 
suggest that in such settings progress could be driven by 
“islands of effectiveness”—narrowly-focused initiatives 
that combine high-quality institutional arrangements at 
the micro-level, plus supportive, narrowly-targeted policy 
reforms. 
   This paper explores whether and how local-level 
collaborative governance can provide a platform for 
these islands of effectiveness. Drawing on the analytical 
framework developed by the Nobel-prize winning 
social scientist Elinor Ostrom, the paper reviews the 
underpinnings of successful collaborative governance. It 
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introduces a simple model for exploring the interactions 
between collaborative governance and political 
economy. The model highlights the conditions under 
which coordination is capable of countering threats 
from predators seeking to capture the returns from 
collaborative governance for themselves. The relative 
strength in the broader environment of two opposing 
networks emerges as key—“threat networks” to which 
predators have access, and countervailing “trumping 
networks” on which protagonists of effective collaborative 
governance can draw. 
   The paper illustrates the potential practical relevance 
of the approach with three heuristic examples: the 
governance of schools, fisheries, and road construction 
and maintenance. It concludes by laying out an agenda 
for further empirical research, and suggesting what might 
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Can Islands of Effectiveness Thrive in Difficult Governance Settings? 





The World Bank‟s 1997 World Development Report, The State in a Changing World, signaled a new 
commitment among mainstream development scholars and practitioners to take governance seriously. At 
first, recognition of the critical role of governance seemed to point naturally towards a fairly 
straightforward (if ambitious) agenda of fostering “good governance” institutions. The general idea was 
that the institutional characteristics of capable and accountable states are well known -- so the reform 
challenge was to redesign a country‟s governance system to incorporate these characteristics.   
 
But over the past decade, appreciation has grown as to the relevance of politics in shaping and 
constraining the governance agenda.
2  And when politics is brought into the equation, the implications of 
the insight that institutions matter become considerably more complex.  Politics (stakeholders, and their 
power, incentives, skill, capacity to organize and constraints) inevitably shapes the dynamics of reform. A 
country‟s economic, social and political institutions cannot be re-engineered from scratch.  Nudging 
forward this interdependent, dynamic process calls for  different approaches to engagement – and 
different ways of identifying which approaches make sense across different country contexts.  
 
The mainstreaming of governance and political economy into development thinking thus has profound 
and unsettling implications for both research and practice. It poses multiple challenges: a substantive 
challenge of revising our understanding of the drivers of development across different country settings in 
a way that takes both institutions and politics seriously; a policy challenge of finding new ways forward 
in the face of this revised understanding – especially in some of the more seemingly intractable 
governance settings; and a research challenge of building a program that is both analytically robust, and 
capable of providing a new generation of useful insights and guidance for development practitioners.   
The principal purpose of this paper is to lay out a different approach to thinking about, and engaging in, 
these difficult governance environments. The suggested approach integrates the analysis of institutions, 
and the analysis of political economy, with a focus on the institutional arrangements for collaborative 
governance. Section II sets the stage by detailing some emerging findings from recent efforts to integrate 
                                                           
2 This recognition is hardly news to political scientists (of a marxist bent or otherwise). The new features are (i) the 
use of analytical frameworks derived directly from the ‘new institutional economics’ which, as with neoclassical 
microeconomics) takes individual decision-making as its point of departure; and (ii) the emerging systematic effort 
to bridge the gap between political economy assessments and familiar, technocratic policy prescriptions.  3 
 
political economy into mainstream development thinking.  Section III lays out the proposed approach in 
some detail. Section IV offers some concrete illustrations; explores the implications of the approach for a 
new generation of empirical research; and highlights its potential relevance for operational practice.  
 
II: Institutions, Elite Bargains, and Development – Some Recent Research 
 
When development practitioners take institutions seriously, one set of challenges emerges with special 
salience – namely that many countries (generally, but not only, low-income; in Africa, and elsewhere) 
must contend with a governance syndrome characterized by a difficult combination of seeming openness, 
weak institutions, and strong inter-elite contestation for power and resources.
3 Characteristic features of 
this governance „syndrome‟ are: 
  Discretionary decision-making, and personalized deals among political elites; 
  Engagement of non-elites in the political process through clientelistic relationships, not through 
programmatic commitments to deliver better development performance; 
  The centrality of rent-generation, capture and distribution to both inter-elite bargaining, and 
political stability more broadly. 
 
A recent series of path-breaking theoretical and empirical analyses on the interactions between 
institutions, political economy and economic performance shed light on the syndrome.  At the aggregate 
level, key recent contributions are North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), North, Wallis, Weingast and Webb 
(2011, forthcoming), Bates (2008), and Khan (2010). A common theme in this literature is that in low-
income countries with underdeveloped formal governance institutions the locus of political stability – and 
hence credible commitment, and private sector development – is to be found in negotiated bargains 
among political elites. These elite bargains center around mutually beneficial agreements vis-à-vis the 
generation and distribution of rents. Bates rigorously models the decision as to whether to cooperate or 
turn to violence in a game-theoretic format.  As Khan details, in some settings elite bargains are centrally 
coordinated by dominant leaders and/or tightly-managed political parties; in other settings, the bargain 
involves more flexible coalitions, with greater attendant risks of moral hazard.  
 
Viewed from the perspective of the normative literature on country-level governance, the implications of 
this work are bleak: Over the short- to medium-term the prospects are vanishingly small of transforming 
negotiated elite bargains into beacons of good governance. Neither the public bureaucracy nor the 
                                                           
3 This is one of a variety of institutional patterns prevalent in low-income countries. Levy (2011, 2010) and Levy and 
Fukuyama (2010) provide a typology of a half-dozen distinctive patterns.  4 
 
institutions that are expected to hold it to account are likely to work well.  Policy will be politicized; top-
down, system-wide approaches to implementation are likely to be ineffective.  Given the prevailing 
incentives, neither broad-based policy nor public management reforms are likely to be feasible.  
 
But are broad-based approaches necessary?  The development experience of a country such as 
Bangladesh (which, as documented in Khan (2011) has combined strong poverty reduction and steady 
growth with endemic corruption, clientelism, and polarized, seemingly dysfunctional political 
contestation)  demonstrates that development can move forward even in the absence of broadly 
encompassing „best practice‟ reforms.  Recent work, summarized in Rodrik (2007), highlights how 
relatively modest reforms which alleviate „binding constraints‟ can unlock growth. What appears to drive 
progress in these settings are “islands of effectiveness” -- narrowly-focused initiatives that combine high-
quality institutional arrangements at the micro-level, plus (as necessary) narrowly-targeted policy reforms 
that facilitate the emergence and operation of these „islands‟.  What might be the political economy 
underpinnings that make it possible for such micro-level institutional initiatives to take root?   
 
A variety of contributions that address the political economy interface between the aggregate and micro-
level offer some insight: 
  In an early effort, Levy and Spiller (1997) explored the relationship between regulatory 
arrangements,  national checks and balances institutions, and performance in the 
telecommunications sector across a half-dozen countries – however, viewed through the lens of 
the more recent contributions, their analysis of the micro-level drivers and constraints focuses 
excessively on formal institutions. 
  Keefer and Khemani (2005) examine the ways in which clientelistic political systems have a bias 
towards the provision of highly-targeted rather than broad-based public goods. 
  Moore and Unsworth (2010) explore the interaction between local-level, informal institutions and 
the broader evolution of state-society relations. 
  A number of economic historians – e.g. Greif (2005), North and Weingast (1989) – have 
produced theoretically robust and empirically anchored research of micro-level credible 
commitment arrangements in medieval Europe. Greif especially anchors his research in careful 
deductive modeling of the interaction between the incentives of actors on the one hand, and the 
emergence of institutions and norms of behavior on the other. 
 
Two contributions by Stephen Haber and associates are especially illuminating.  Haber et al. (2003) detail 
the institutional arrangements that underpinned sector-level dynamism in Mexico‟s clientelistic political 5 
 
economy almost throughout the half-century from the 1880s-1930s. Haber et al. (2008) extend the 
analysis for middle-income Mexico over the subsequent half-century.  A central finding in these analyses 
is that, contra the general view of property rights as a public good, they can in fact be „privatized‟.  Haber 
explores both theoretically and empirically the role of ad hoc discretionary institutional arrangements -- 
partnership, monitoring, and (in a game-theoretic sense) „hostage-taking‟ -- that link individual private 
investors with politically influential actors who are well-positioned to assure that government does not 
renege on its promises. Such arrangements, he shows, can provide the credible commitments private 
actors need to invest, even during difficult, violent times. 
 
Haber‟s conclusions are profoundly discomfiting for policymakers, donors and other development 
practitioners who focus their attention on „best practice‟ solutions. But viewed from a different 
perspective than „best practice‟, they can also be interpreted as pointing towards a way forward in 
difficult settings:  The results suggest that, beyond a very  de minimis agenda, growth in weak governance 
settings does not require good broad-based policies and institutions. More focused policy reforms, and 
more narrowly targeted institutional arrangements can suffice. This is a key motivating insight for the 
approach laid out in this paper. 
 
III:  (How) Can Collaborative Governance Be Effective in Difficult Governance Settings? A 
Framework 
 
This section explores analytically the potential role of local-level collaborative governance as an entry 
point for development in weaker governance settings.   First, it highlights the relevance of collaborative 
governance– both as an approach that potentially can be applied in a wide variety of settings, and as a 
mechanism for limiting the costs of dysfunctional governance.  Thereafter it reviews analytically the 
underpinnings of successful collaborative governance, and introduces a simple model for exploring the 
interactions between collaborative governance and political economy in countries where formal 
institutions are weak.   
 
III.A: Varieties of Collaboration and Their Hazards: Concepts and Examples 
Collaborative governance comprises a set of institutional arrangements designed to achieve a collective 
purpose in which there are multiple principals – including principals from the public sector. As Box 1 
clarifies, there is a very close correspondence between the definitions of collaborative governance and of 
collective action. Collective action, though, has come to be associated with situations where the relevant 
principals are non-governmental, and also sometimes is applied narrowly to the governance of common 6 
 
pool resources.  Though this paper draws liberally on (and extends) the literature on collective action, the 
term „collaborative governance‟ is preferred as a way of making explicit that the framework is intended to 
have broader applicability than is usually associated with collective action.  
 
Box 1: Collaborative governance and collective action – some definitions 
Ostrom (1990) defines „collective action‟ as the process whereby “a group of principals who are in an 
interdependent situation can organize and govern themselves to adopt coordinated strategies to obtain (and maintain) 
higher joint benefits when all face temptations to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically…”   The process 
is one in which a new set of institutions [rules of the game] that facilitate cooperation are supplied, in which 
participants credibly commit to follow the rules, and in which principals engage in mutual monitoring of 
conformance to the rules…..  
 
A striking feature of the above definition – and the reason that the term „collaborative governance‟ is preferred in 
this paper -- is that, in principle, the relevant principals can comprise both governmental and non-governmental 
actors.  Including governmental actors as a co-equal among the principals presumes that, in the context of the 
specific collaborative endeavor being considered, they  have similar standing – as co-principals – as do non-
governmental actors. This is consistent with a legislated governance framework that delegates decision making to 
the collectivity. It also is consistent with the North, Wallis and Weingast (2009) approach to the analysis of 
governance in low-income and institutionally weak settings as a series of elite bargains; they argue that the classic 
characteristic of the Weberian state – „a monopoly over the the legitimate use of violence‟ – is achieved relatively 
late in the development process. 
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons, pp. 29, 39, 42-45 
 
Box 2 provides examples of collaborative governance which are consistent with this broad definition. The 
examples range from the governance of common pool resources (the classic example of collective action); 
to initiatives among groups of private firms to provide quasi public goods; to collaborative governance of 
public service provision; and governance of autonomous public agencies.  
Box 2: Varieties of collaborative governance – some examples 
This paper takes a broad view of collaborative governance as a mechanism for creating and/or managing rents to 
achieve social rather than private purposes: (i) It incorporates (as per the discussion of Box 1) collaborative multi-
stakeholder governance involving both governmental and non-governmental actors as well as action exclusively 
among non-governmental actors.  (ii)  It defines broadly what might qualify as “rents” that potentially are 
governable through collaborative mechanisms.  The crucial commonality is that the realization of social returns is 
based on cooperation among diverse stakeholders who, in the specific context, operate largely as peers (“principals”) 
vis-à-vis one another.  Three distinct types of collaborative governance can be identified: 
  Collaborative governance that aims to govern common pool resources in a sustainable manner. This is the 
classic collective action challenge explored in depth by Elinor Ostrom. Examples from work by her and her 
associates include 
o  Collective governance of irrigation systems; 
o  Collective governance of inshore fisheries; 
o  Collective governance of communally-owned land; 
o  Collective governance of groundwater resources;  
o  Collective governance of forests. 
As Ostrom details, these common pool resources can be managed through self-organization among non-
government principals with access to the resource, through government regulation, or through hybrid 
arrangements involving partnership between governmental and non-governmental actors.  
 7 
 
  Collaborative governance that aims to facilitate coordination among non-governmental actors to both produce a 
quasi-rent (a quasi-public-good)  and share the benefits among all participant/beneficiaries. Examples include: 
   
o  Cluster initiatives among private (manufacturing and other)  firms within a given sector or value 
chain to facilitate mutually-linked investments, or  to jointly invest in learning or market 
facilitation; 
o  Outgrowing arrangements in which processers and small-holder farmers collaborate around 
common rules governing the provision of inputs and the sale of crops; these can combine vertical 
(i.e. between farmers and processers) and horizontal (i.e. between groups of farmers and groups of 
processers) institutional arrangements.  
Note that these arrangements might include some involvement by public actors in support of the private 
initiatives, and might include also advocacy of targeted policy reforms.  
 
  Collaborative governance that aims to assure that public resources allocated for a specific service provision 
purpose are indeed used as intended. Viewed from the perspective of the potential beneficiaries, these public 
resources – e.g. government paid positions, or public financial resources made available to procure necessary 
inputs -- can be interpreted as a rent/common pool resource with the potential to be used for the social purpose, 
or captured for private ends. Examples of collaborative governance in this domain include: 
o  Collaborative governance of schools, health clinics and other front-line service provision facilities 
by multi-stakeholder groups which include service recipients and others with a stake in the 
efficiency and effectiveness of service provision.   
o  Multi-stakeholder oversight of public sector procurement – for example through joint 
commitments by private bidders and public agencies to govern specific large-scale, procurement-
intensive public projects through „integrity pacts‟. 
o  Public-private partnerships and/or other collaborative, multi-stakeholder arrangements to govern 
the operation of formally state-owned entities, and of other arms-length public agencies.   
 
Though the examples in Box 2 are diverse, they share a common set of coordination challenges:  
  The ubiquitous challenge of facilitating cooperation among participants to achieve joint benefits, 
in a way that limits the classic free rider and other moral hazard challenges associated with 
collective action. [The term CA-Q is used below to designate this first type of productivity-
enhancing collaborative initiative.]  
  A challenge that is relevant especially in weaker governance settings – namely coordination to 
counter threats from predators seeking to capture the returns from collaborative governance for 
themselves. [The term CA-P is used to designate this second type of predator-repelling 
collaborative initiative.]  
 
Predation is a key concept for the analysis that follows.  Box 3 below defines ‘predation’ in terms of the 
willingness and ability of predators to override with impunity formal and informal rules.  Predators are 
individuals or groups who seek to capture collectively created or managed rents for private purposes. The 
threat from predators can manifest at either or both of two levels: 
  At the level of the collaborative initiative itself, predators might choose to ignore with impunity 
mechanisms agreed among participants for monitoring and enforcement, as not applying to them. 
Additionally,  8 
 
  Predators might leverage their influence networks to put themselves out of reach of any formal 
legal frameworks to which CA-Q participants might otherwise have had recourse for resolving 
disputes and sanctioning illegal acts.  
 
Box 3: Predation defined 
Predation is defined here to refer specifically to actions that use channels of political support external to the specific 
arena of cooperation to override with impunity the formal and informal rules of the game associated with the 
collaborative effort. Note that predation is more far-reaching in its impunity than each of  the following, common 
hazards of collective action: 
 
  Distributive conflicts among participants in a collective action effort as to how to share the benefits, and/or 
conflicts over who will lead the effort – which need involve no element of opportunism.
4 
  ‘Free riding’ in which a presumptive participant in a collective effort chooses to shirk on his obligations, 
but nonetheless enjoys a share of the benefits – mutual monitoring is a key way in which protagonists of 
collective action mitigate this risk. 
  Corruption, in which a participant in a collective action effort pays (or accepts) a bribe to illegally over-
ride an agreed-upon formal or informal rule – but (contra to predation) is vulnerable to detection and, if 
detected, is subject to sanction. 
 
. 
III.B: How Collaborative Governance and Predation Interact 
A central hypothesis of this paper is that productivity-enhancing and predator-repelling collaborative 
initiatives can be provided as joint products.  Local level actors cooperate to produce a joint benefit and, 
in the process, are able to co-produce predation deterrence at low marginal cost. This is the 
(hypothesized) reason why otherwise unexpected islands of success can thrive in weak governance 
settings.  
 
How do collaborative governance and predation (and its deterrence) interact with one another? The point 
of departure for the analysis is Elinor Ostrom‟s Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework 
(see Ostrom, 2005 for a comprehensive presentation). The framework links systematically the social goal 
being pursued, individual decisions as to whether to cooperate, the quality of collective action, and the 
results achieved. Consistent with rational choice theory, it anchors its analysis of cooperation in 
individual decisions, based on individual assessments of the costs and benefits -- and likelihood of 
achieving the benefits -- of cooperation.  Figure 1 below provides a summary illustration of the 
connections. As the figure suggests, the individual decision as to whether or not to cooperate will be 
                                                           
4 The classic point is made by Ronald Coase (1960) where he underscores that socially efficient solutions 
potentially are consistent with a wide variety of distributions of benefits – but that conflicts over the distribution of 
benefits could raise the transactions costs of collective action to the point that it fails to eventuate. 9 
 
influenced, in part, by the actual and perceived behavior of others with whom the cooperative endeavor 
might be undertaken.  
    
Figure 1: How individual incentives, collective action and performance interact 
 
   





Ostrom identifies a set of eight „good practice‟ principles for the governance of collective action. (See 
Box 4.) These good practice principles are derived from both theory and empirical analysis. Their 
theoretical anchors comprises the IAD‟s „action situation‟ framework for analyzing institutions  – where 
action situations comprise “the social space where participants with diverse preferences interact, 
exchange goods and services, solve problems, dominate one another, or fight”; as per the framework, all 
action situations are governed by seven sets of „working rules‟
5 Their empirical basis  comprises the 
voluminous  analysis  by Ostrom and associates, over the past thirty-plus years,  of the „working rules‟ 
which govern hundreds of common pool resources, in dozens of countries.  On the basis of a meta-
analysis of this work, Ostrom concludes that “robust systems for governing common pool resources had 
met most of the good practice principles, and that those systems that had collapsed or were performing 
ineffectively were not so structured” (Ostrom, 2005, p. 259).   
An important gap in the IAD framework is that it does not explore the interactions between collaborative 
governance and the broader political economy environment. Instead, the framework treats politics as an 
                                                           
5 Ostrom (2005), p.14. Viewed through the lens of the IAD framework, the term ‘institution’ is thus defined 
precisely – more so than the usual, and very general, ‘rules of the game’ – as ‘a set of working rules that govern an 
action situation’. The seven elements Ostrom identifies seven common elements of all action situations, each with 
an associated set of working rules.  The seven elements are (i) actors and associated boundary rules which define 
who is eligible to enter a position; (ii) positions and associated position rules which create positions for participants 
to enter; (iii) actions and associated choice rules: which specify what a participant occupying a position must/must 
not/may do at a particular point in a decision process; (iv) control and associated aggregation rules which 
determine how collective decisions are to be arrived at; (v) potential outcomes and associated  scope rules which 
define and regulate the range of acceptable outcomes (vi) information about actions and outcomes and associated 
information rules which assign the obligation/permission or prohibition to communicate to participants in  
positions… and the language/form in which the communication will take place; and (vii) net costs and benefits and 
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exogenous variable whose impact is derived via the mediating impact of higher level institutions. Thus, 
Ostrom (2005; p.58) suggests that “what can be done at one level will depend on the capabilities and 
limits of the rules at that level and at a deeper level”.  The dilemma, though, is that in low-income 
countries with weak institutions -- the focus of the present paper -- these higher-level arrangements are ad 
hoc, personalized, and discretionary. As generally applied, the IAD framework thus assumes away the 
political economy complexities that are central to the development challenge of many low-income 
countries.  
 
Box 4: ‘Good Practice’ Principles for Collaborative Governance 
This formulation of the principles is taken  from Ostrom (2005, 2009), adapted to fit the broader focus of the present 
effort on multiple types of  collaborative governance, beyond the specific issues associated with common pool 
resources.  The principles are: 
  Clearly defined participant boundaries: Clear and locally understood boundaries between legitimate 
participants and non-participants are present. 
  Collective choice arrangements. Most individuals affected by the collaborative initiative are authorized to 
participate in making and modifying its rules. 
  Proportional equivalence between benefits and costs. Rules specifying the amounts that a participant 
benefits are proportional to the distribution of labor, materials and other costs.  
  Monitoring.  Monitors who actively audit participant behavior are at least partially accountable to the 
participants and/or are the participants themselves. 
  Conflict-Resolution Mechanisms: Rapid, low-cost, local arenas exist for resolving conflicts among 
participants or with officials. 
  Graduated Sanctions: Sanctions for rule violations start very low but become stronger if a user repeatedly 
violates a rule. 
  Minimal Recognition of Rights: The rights of participants to set rules (or participate in rulemaking) are 
recognized by the government. 
  Nested Enterprises: Governance activities are organized in multiple nested layers, with a clearly defined, 
autonomous domain of decision-making for local-level collective action 
 
 
In difficult-governance settings, what happens when productivity enhancing collective action (CA-Q) at 
local levels collides with predators seeking to capture these rents for themselves?   Certainly, the presence 
of predators who aim to over-ride with impunity efforts to build rule-boundedness complicates the 
challenge of fostering collaborative governance.  But – and this is the central proposition of the present 
paper – their presence need not render collaborative governance impotent. Protagonists of CA-Q 
potentially can resist the threat of predation by drawing on their own channels of influence. Thus:  
  „Threat‟ resources comprise the influence networks external to the action situation on which 
predators might draw to over-ride with impunity rules intended to facilitate cooperation and 
restrain discretion.  
  „Trumping‟ resources comprise the countervailing influence networks external to the action 
situation on which participants in CA-Q might draw to facilitate compliance with rules.  11 
 
Incorporating „threat‟ and „trumping‟ variables into the analysis provides an analytic  bridge between 
Ostrom‟s framework and the broader political economy considerations laid out in Section II.
6  
 
Analytically, predation can be viewed as a „sub-game‟ within a broader extended cooperative game. 
Potential predators have to decide whether to predate; participants in the prior CA-Q game have to decide 
whether to resist. To illustrate the logic of the situation, consider a scenario where: (i) quasi-rent 
enhancing cooperation (i.e. CA-Q) already is in place, and is functioning effectively; (ii) predators arrive 
on the scene, seeking to capture the rent resource; and (iii) the participants in CA-Q choose to resist.  As 
the decision tree in Figure 2 suggests, the result will depend on the relative magnitude of threat and 
trumping resources.  
 
Underlying the construction of Figure 2 are assumptions as to what information is available to the 
protagonists of the sub-game. If both CA-Q participants and predators are fully informed as to the 
magnitude of the threat and trumping resources that each has available, then (contra to Figure 2) conflict 
will never be observed. If „trump‟ > „threat‟, potential predators, realizing that they will lose, will refrain 
from engaging, and CA-Q will be effective and undisturbed. Conversely, if „trump‟ < „threat‟, CA-Q 
participants will conclude that it is pointless to resist, CA-Q will disintegrate, and performance will 
decline rapidly.  
 













                                                           
6 This analysis of conflict through the lens of a game structured around the relative power of threat and trumping 






























In practice, insofar as both „threat‟ and „trumping‟ operate through informal channels, knowledge as to 
their actual value is likely to be uncertain – and also quite dependent on the specific identities and 
networks of individual players – suggesting that conflict scenarios could be quite likely. Table 1a 
summarizes the options in a scenario where „trump‟ > „threat‟, but this reality is not recognized by one or 
both of the protagonists; Table 1b summarizes the converse scenario -- the reality where „trump‟ < 
„threat‟. In all, four possible patterns are evident: 
  The „full information equivalent‟ scenario where perceptions are aligned with underlying reality, 
and the result is as described in Figure 2.  
  Conflict scenarios – where expectations are misaligned on the part of one of the protagonists, 
with conflict the immediate consequence, and a better-informed equilibrium outcome the eventual 
result. 
  Unnecessarily poor performance scenarios (in Table 1a) -- where predation dominates, but CA-Q 
protagonists could prevail, were they only willing to organize and take up the fight.  
  Fragile, high performance scenarios (in Table 1b) -- where CA-Q is effective, but could readily 
be reversed were predators to recognize their coercive potential.  
 
Table 1: Collaborative Governance and Predation: How perceptions and outcomes interact 
Scenario I: Actual Threat < Actual Trumping  Scenario II: Actual Threat > Actual Trumping 

























































A final figure illustrates the links among individual decision-making,  the predator-threat sub-game, and 
the quality more broadly of collaborative governance across a variety of seemingly separate arenas. 
Recall that (as per Figure 1) individuals base their decision as to whether or not to cooperate in part of 
their perception as to the probability of the benefits of cooperation being achieved. Figure 3 underscores 
that this decision is centrally influenced by their judgments as to the likely outcome of any predation 
threat. If they judged that the threat could be deterred effectively, individuals might choose to cooperate. 13 
 
But if their judgment was that predation was too powerful to overcome, potential participants would 
recognize that the probability of enjoying the benefits of collective action was low, and so would be 
deterred from embarking on this always (even in the most benign circumstances) challenging endeavor.   










While Figure 3 focuses on individual decisions, it points to the possibility of feedback effects from the 
broader environment, and hence of „tipping points‟ across a broad variety of arenas for potential 
cooperation. As the figure underscores, individual actors decisions as to whether to participate in a 
cooperative endeavor are based on their expectations – and these expectations are formed from many 
influences, indirect as well as direct. Pessimistically, in the face of repeated evidence of successful 
predation across their society, potential cooperators might increasingly give up on their efforts, resulting 
in a growing number of failures, and a downward spiral of quiescence and predation. But the alternative 
also is possible – a virtuous spiral of accelerating cooperation and enhanced performance across multiple 
arenas as an increasing number of  hitherto quiescent local actors, inspired by an increasing number of 
brave successes, step forward to work together in  pursuit of social goals.   
 
IV: From Theory to Empirics and Practice 
As noted at the outset of this paper, the motivation for exploring the analytics of predation is a cutting-
edge real-world challenge: finding feasible ways of achieving development gains in settings characterized 
by a difficult combination of seeming political and economic openness, weak institutions, and strong 
inter-elite contestation for power and resources. The theory laid out in Section III provides a point of 
departure for inquiry. But generating knowledge that can help address this challenge calls for moving 
beyond theory and engaging also with the empirical reality.  
 
Expected 













This final section bridges theory and empirics in three ways: First, to illustrate the potential practical 
relevance of what so far has been a conceptual discussion, three heuristic examples are presented of how 
threat-trumping dynamics can underpin surprising islands of effectiveness. Second, a proposed approach 
to  rigorous empirical research is laid out.  Finally, some suggestions are made as to what might be the 
implications of the approach for future operational practice.  
 
IV.A: Three Heuristic Illustrations 
This sub-section offers extended illustrations of the potential interactions between collaborative 
governance and the threat-trumping game for three of the many examples suggested in Box 2. 
 
Multi-stakeholder school-governing bodies and teacher absenteeism. Teaching positions allocated to 
public schools can be interpreted as akin to a „common pool resource‟ available to the local community – 
but in many developing countries teacher absenteeism (free riding on the resource) is a ubiquitous 
problem. „Transparency and participation‟ increasingly are advocated as a solution -- but what is the 
„transmission mechanism‟? The analytic framework laid out in Section III suggests that there are two key 
dimensions. The first dimension comprises the quality of participation of parents and other stakeholders 
in school governance: Better quality engagement is hypothesized to provide a first line of defense against 
teacher absenteeism – with  the „good practice‟ principles offering a benchmark against which to assess 
the quality of participatory school-level governance.   
 
The second dimension comprises the threat-trumping dynamics. In difficult governance settings, teacher 
absenteeism is likely to be underpinned by powerful influence networks (e.g. teachers unions, or 
patronage-dispensing politicians). Well-organized school governing bodies can try to countervail the 
threat by drawing on their „trumping‟ influence networks (e.g. appeals to respected community and 
religious leaders, or to national NGOs). The analytic framework suggests that school performance in 
general  – and the acceptance of absenteeism versus disciplinary action in particular – is likely to be 
dependent on the relative strength of these contrasting networks.  
 
Fishing rights.  The allocation of valuable fishing rights often raises difficult distributive challenges; 
collective organization of a fishery has been one way of jointly addressing the challenges of equity and of 
sustainability. But, as per the definition in Box 1, contrast these distributive challenges with  predation – 
say a foreign company that bribes officials to grant it rights that result in over-fishing in excess of a pre-
agreed ceiling, and  leverages its external influence networks (its „threat resources‟) to assure that no 
effort is made to overturn the regulatory decision.  15 
 
 
How might incumbent fishing operations respond to this threat of predation?  The analytic framework 
directs attention to the role of „trumping networks‟. Fishing companies seeking to protect both their 
continuing access to the resource, and its sustainability, might usefully seek to build alliances with 
environmental activists – or with retailers committed to sustainable trade -- to expose and reverse policies 
that threaten overfishing. Globally, the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC), which offers „eco-labels‟ to 
fisheries that are certified as being managed sustainably, offers a natural potential ally. But why do only 
some fisheries, but not others, successfully leverage the MSC‟s potential?  The analytic framework 
suggests that the answer may lie in a combination of the readiness of fishing companies to work 
collaboratively to address these challenges – and in the relative strength of the „threat‟ and „trumping‟ 
networks.  
 
Road fund governance. Across Africa, and elsewhere, there has been widespread creation of road funds 
as a way of ensuring that vehicle taxes, and other earmarked revenues, are used as intended for road 
construction and maintenance. But procurement contracts associated with road construction are 
notoriously corrupt. In institutionally weak settings, can collaborative governance of road funds protect 
against the predation of this public resource?  
 
The analytical framework in Section III suggests that inclusion in the governing board of the road fund of  
users of the road network who have a stake in its quality (e.g. haulage companies, business associations) 
has the potential to counterbalance the corrupt use of road fund resources. But realizing this potential will 
depend (again) on two dimensions. First, are the collaborative governance arrangements themselves 
robust – in the sense that the stakeholder participants genuinely are empowered as full participants in the 
corporate governance arrangements (as opposed to, whatever the formal rules might suggest,  serving 
only at the pleasure of key political and bureaucratic actors)? Second, insofar as they are empowered to 
participate, what the strength of the „trumping‟ networks to which stakeholders have access relative to the 
strength of the predatory threat? The framework suggests that whether road funds have the potential to be 
effective in protecting against predation will depend on the answers to the above two questions – and that 
the answers almost surely will vary from country to country.  
 
IV.B:  An Approach to Empirical Research 
This section will consider three questions as to how to apply the framework in empirical research: What 
sub-sample might most usefully be the target of empirical research?  What research methodology is best 
fitted to the research task? What are the specific refutable hypotheses around which the empirical effort 16 
 
might be organized? The discussion will frame its suggestions as to how empirical research might 
proceed in quite general terms; the reader might usefully provide more concreteness by filtering the 
discussion through the lens of one or more of the specific examples laid out above.   
Sub-sample selection. The theory laid out in Section III suggests that the interaction between 
collaborative governance and predation could result in three distinct empirical patterns: 
  Pattern I: No observed cooperation (and hence the absence of the good practice principles in the 
relevant action situation), poor development outcomes, and evidence of capture by one or more 
groups of predators.  
  Pattern II: High quality collaborative governance (as evidenced by the presence of Ostrom‟s good 
practice principles), good development outcomes – and a seeming absence of predation (which, it 
was hypothesized, might signal either the absence of predators, or a perception by putative 
predators that trumping resources were more powerful than their threat resources, and thus that 
the returns from the effort to predate would be negative). 
  Pattern III: Significant episodes of conflict between the protagonists of collaborative governance 
and predators – with a wide variety of potential outcomes.  
Pattern I is empirically uninteresting: with no cooperation evident, only governance failure can be 
observed. Pattern II is  somewhat more interesting insofar as it can provide an empirical basis for 
exploring empirically Ostrom‟s suggested relationship between the presence (or absence) of the „good 
practice‟ principles for collaborative governance, and development outcomes in areas other than the 
common pool resource problem on which the bulk of research has focused. Pattern III is most interesting: 
empirical research into these episodes of conflict holds high potential for contributing at the frontier of 
development research and practice. Indeed, for reasons laid out further below, it is proposed that the 
principal research effort be focused on Pattern III-style examples.  
 
Research methodology. The “analytic narratives” framework, summarized in Box 6, is proposed as one 
which fits best with the empirical questions raised by Pattern III.  Analytic narratives provide a 
disciplined approach for learning about  the interaction between efforts at  collaborative governance  and 
associated threat-trumping sub-games  in  specific, concrete settings:   They can shed light on both the 
proximate determinants of performance of the specific action situation being studied and, more broadly, 
on the character of influence networks that potentially extend all the way from the front-line to the 
national level.  Exploring these interactions against the backdrop of knowledge as to how the conflict was 
resolved – i.e. who prevailed – will provide invaluable insight into the relative strengths of the competing 
networks in specific settings.     17 
 
 
Box 6: The ‘Analytic Narratives’ Research Methodology – Some Key Features 
 
Rational choice, with game theory as an analytic platform:  “In an effort to move from [description] to 
explanation, we move from „thick‟ accounts to „thin‟ forms of reasoning. We seek to highlight and focus 
upon the logic of the processes that generate the phenomena we study. In doing so, we use rational choice 
theory. We find game theoretic models particularly useful ways of exploring the validity of narrative 
accounts….We seek to construct the game that provides the link between the prominent features of the 
narrative and its outcome”. (p.14) 
 
Linking games and empirical research. “We seek to account for outcomes by identifying and exploring 
the mechanisms that generate them….By reading documents, laboring through archives, interviewing, 
and surveying the secondary literature, we seek to understand the actors‟ preferences, their perceptions, 
their evaluation of alternatives, the information they possess, the expectations they form, the strategies 
they adopt, and the constraints that limit their actions. We seek to cut deeply into the specifics of a time 
and place, and to locate and trace the processes that generate the outcome of interest.” (pp. 11-12) 
 
Deduction and induction. Analytic narratives  “blur the conventional distinction between deduction and 
induction…. The(ir) construction  is  an iterative process…They depart from conventional notions of 
hypothesis testing. The dominant response to disconfirmation is reformulation not falsification…. We 
move back and forth between interpretation and case materials, modifying the explanation in light of the 
data, which itself is viewed in new ways, given our evolving understanding …[so that] in the end we 
achieve a match between theory and case materials”. (pp. 16-17)
7”: 
  Generating theory. “Initially the theory is formed from the data; it is selected because it appears 
to offer a good fit. Rendered explicit, the theory then becomes vulnerable; it can be subject both 
to logical appraisal and to empirical testing. 
  Disciplining the narrative. “Theory places constraints upon the narrative; the account is 
constrained by the logic of the theory. 
  Modifying theory . “The cases derive implications from theory; but when the case materials do 
not confirm their expectations, the authors respond by reformulating their models and by altering 
the way in which they think about the problem. 
  Postdiction? “When models highlight features of the data that hitherto have escaped attention; 
when they can be contradicted by the evidence; and when they predict relationships that must 
hold, if their equilibria capture the processes that generate the phenomena of concern – then we 
are well beyond mere exercises in „curve fitting‟. 
Source: Bates, Robert H. Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, Barry R. Weingast (1998), Analytic 
Narratives (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 
Testable hypotheses. While it is in the nature of the „analytic narratives‟ approach that much of the 
learning about the character and relative strength of various influence networks will be inductive, five sets 
of initial hypotheses are laid out below as a way of clarifying the analytical target of the empirical 
endeavor, and thereby providing an initial guide to the (iterative) empirical work.  
  H1. The presence of collaborative governance  helps combat predation: 
                                                           
7 The authors underscore that their approach is consistent with the insights into the scientific method provided by 
Thomas Kuhn (1962) and Imre Lakatos (1970).  18 
 
o  H1A: Collaborative governance arrangements to sustainably manage rents, or to create 
quasi-rents (i.e. CA-Q), are likely to be successful insofar as their working rules are well 
aligned with good practice principles. 
o  H1B: Effective CA-Q provides a platform for combating predation, insofar as it enables 
protagonists to combine their individual, potential „trumping‟ networks into a common 
predation-fighting front.   
 
Research to address this hypothesis will provide the empirical baseline for the overall analytical narrative. 
Key elements would include:  (i) a description of the “outcome”, that is the extent to which the 
collaborative governance initiative being studied has achieved its intended social goal; (ii) 
characterization of  the working rules governing the collaborative governance situation being studied – 
with the specific goal of  assessing the extent to which they align with the „good practice‟ principles laid 
out earlier; (iii) documentation of what, if any, predation threats arose, and how they were resolved.  
  H2. Leadership facilitates collaborative governance – both CA-Q and CA-P. 
o  H2A: Leadership facilitates CA-Q by reducing the transactions costs of coordination.  
(This leadership can come from within the group seeking to cooperate, or from an 
external facilitator.) 
o  H2B: Leaders will be instrumental in winning commitment among the CA-Q protagonists 
to take up the fight against predation.  
 
This part of the “analytic narrative” would: (i)  describe how the CA-Q cooperation emerged: how it was 
initiated, how it was consolidated, and how it was sustained, with a particular focus on the role of key 
individuals in its evolution; (ii) detail how the participants in CA-Q responded when faced with a threat of 
predation, with a specific focus on (iii) the role of key individuals in persuading the CA-Q participants to 
confront the threat, and in orchestrating the subsequent response.   
  H3: Access to trumping networks helps combat predation: 
o  H3A: There will be variations across CA-Q action situations in the extent to which the 
CA-Q protagonists have access to „trumping‟ networks of influence.  
o  H3B: Settings where the CA-Q protagonists have better access to such networks –by 
virtue of higher incomes, histories of political activism, religious networks, or other 
context-specific linkages – are more likely to prevail over predators.  
 
  H4: Shared social norms strengthen ‘trumping’ networks. 
o  H4A: To combat predation, CA-Q protagonists draw on shared norms of fairness and 
justice that prevail within their societies (e.g. the primacy of law; religious and other 
ethical values; and/or values rooted in a pivotal, earlier political struggle). Thus 
o  H4B: The effort to combat predation is more likely to prevail in settings where such 
shared norms continue to have some currency in political contestation.  
 
Addressing H3A&B and H4A&B comprises the heart of the “analytic narrative”. Empirical work would 
focus on the inter-connections between the immediate threat-trumping game and the broader political 
economy environment within which it played out. It would examine (i) what were the networks of 19 
 
influence used by predators to underpin their threat; (ii) what, if any, were the countervailing influence 
networks  on  which the CA-Q protagonists drew;  and (iii) why the conflict was resolved in the way it 
was. A key goal would be to generate insights from the in-depth analysis of the specific threat-trumping 
game into the larger political dynamics at play (including what might be entry points, beyond the 
immediate action situation, for leveraging the broader political economy in the direction of positive 
development outcomes).  The larger the number of cases, and the more diverse the patterns, the richer will 
be the insights that emerge. But the value added of an analytical narrative of a single case with revealing 
patterns of threat-trumping conflict, and its resolution, can also be high. 
  H5. Successful collaborative governance is facilitated by complementary, focused policy support. 
o  H5A: The participants (and leadership/facilitators) of the collaborative governance 
initiative lobbied successfully for the necessary enabling policy reforms. 
 
The point of departure of this paper is that in weak governance settings, the overall political environment 
is likely to be too fragmented for a focus on broad-based policy reforms to be effective. But this should 
not be taken to imply that policy reform is irrelevant. In such settings narrowly focused reforms might be 
eminently implementable – and sometimes necessary to facilitate successful cooperation. Empirical 
research would: (i) examine what, if any, specific policy measures supported the collaborative initiative; 
(ii) assess the extent to which they were narrowly-focused policy initiatives or broad-based measures to 
facilitate the relevant enabling environment; and (iii) describe the origin of these policy measures. Of 
specific interest will be the timing of policy reforms and of the collaborative endeavor: which preceded 
which? Did policy reform catalyze cooperation, or did the protagonists of the relevant collaborative 
initiative successfully lobby for the requisite reforms? 
 
IV.C: Implications for Practitioners  
Operational practice rarely, if ever, waits on the results of robust research before moving forward. Indeed, 
a major push has been under way for some years to foster transparency, participation and accountability at  
the service delivery front-line (and efforts to foster inter-firm „clusters‟ and  local-level collective action 
in the management of common pool resources are long-standing). What might be the implications of the 
approach laid out in this paper for enhancing these operational agendas?  
 
First, and most obviously, the relevance of Elinor Ostrom‟s IAD „good practice‟ principles potentially is 
much broader than the common pool resource arena where they usually are applied.  As this paper has 
underscored, there is a rich variety of arenas of collaborative governance; for many of them, the good 
practice principles can provide guideposts for effective design. A broader application of the good practice 
principles may be especially helpful in giving more precise operational content to at least some aspects of 20 
 
„participation‟ – which has become ubiquitous, almost a panacea,  in development discourse and practice 
but often is framed in exceedingly general terms. 
   
Second, the analytical framework suggests that there may be some (perhaps many) arenas where 
protagonists of potential collaborative governance  have not come forward in part because they perceive 
the threat of predation to be too  high to be countered. However, given skillful leveraging of the latent 
trumping resources to which the CA-Q protagonists potentially have access, this perception could prove 
to be erroneous. Both cooperation and, by extension, the mobilization and orchestration of „trumping‟ 
resources are learned skills. So in principle practitioners might   be in a position to provide practical 
guidance to CA-Q protagonists as to how they might more effectively engage. Such guidance calls for 
knowledge as to the details of how the „threat- and „trumping‟ mechanisms operate – and these details are 
likely to vary widely from country-to-country (and, plausibly, across the regions and sectors within a 
country).  There is thus substantial potential for synergies between practitioners and researchers.  
 
Third, in those settings where the magnitude of the predation threat is larger than available trumping 
resources, it may be possible for practitioners to augment trumping resources – and thereby reverse an 
earlier equilibrium. Two illustrative examples of potential augmentation: 
  Enhanced transparency: Transparent information on performance potentially provides CA-Q 
protagonists with a focal point around which to organize. Further -- in the spirit of “transparency 
is the best disinfectant” --  it has the potential to expose to the light of day,  and thereby deter, 
practices which  are broadly perceived as socially illegitimate.  
  Support for strengthened horizontal associations. Insofar as protagonists of CA-Q  are likely  to 
vary in the extent to which they have access to trumping resources, stronger horizontal 
associations – e.g. associations of school governing bodies or parents associations; farmers 
associations – could help close the gap, by providing new sets of allies to which CA-Q 
protagonists might turn for support.  
 
One final point. Evidently, facilitating more effective collaborative governance involves quite substantial 
transactions costs, with the benefits likely to be „retail‟ – one arena at a time. A skeptical reader might 
thus wonder whether the returns might not be higher from a more direct focus on broad-based policy 
reforms or broad-based efforts to  improve public management. But recall the point of departure of this 
paper:  Broad-based policy and public management reforms often are not likely to be feasible in difficult 
governance settings – but focused collaborative governance initiatives (and complementary narrowly-
focused policy initiatives) do not require „good governance‟ as a pre-requisite, and both theory and 21 
 
evidence has demonstrated that broadly encompassing „best practice‟ reforms are not necessary to move 
development forward.  And recall also the possibility (illustrated in Figure 3) of „tipping points‟ – of 
social learning in response to evidence of successful collaborative governance setting in motion virtuous 
spirals of accelerating cooperation and enhanced performance across multiple arenas by an increasing 
number of hitherto quiescent actors.  
 
All too often, development advocacy in weaker governance settings comprises the endless reiteration of 
„best practice‟ policy and governance nostrums, which fail to be implemented – with the only fruits of the 
effort being frustration, hostility, cynicism and despair. In such settings, the effort to leverage 
collaborative governance to build islands of effectiveness emerges as a potentially more implementable 
alternative:  It works „with the grain‟ of the prevailing political economy realities, and is capable of 
achieving results which, though often seemingly quite modest, are valuable in themselves. Further, the 
steady accumulation of small gains can help sustain hope as to the possibility of building a better life for 
all. Though the focus of individual efforts might be narrow, the overall impact need not be small. 
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